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FORMALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY
Cass R. Sunstein*
In law, what does it mean to “interpret” a text, including the
Constitution? There are some things that cannot be counted as
interpretation. If a judge engages in freestanding moral theory
and ignores the text, she is not interpreting it. If she reads it
backwards, and tries to make sense out of it that way, she is
probably making some kind of joke. At the same time, there is
nothing that interpretation just is. Some people think that it is best
to follow intended meaning. Others are committed to the original
public meaning. Others favor some kind of moral reading—an
idea that can itself take multiple forms, and that on certain
assumptions might even entail use of intended meaning or
original public meaning. The choice among plausible accounts of
interpretation requires people to resort to their own arguments,
external to the text, typically in the form of claims about what will
make a constitutional order better rather than worse.1
In response to an essay of mine on this topic, Richard Ekins
has produced nearly ten thousand words on interpretation, largely
in defense of his claim that interpretation just is an effort to
uncover intended meaning.2 Ekins has obviously thought long and
hard about this topic, and his essay bristles with both intelligence
and learning. Moreover, his view is shared by other intelligent
people. But in my view, Ekins is making a simple error, which is
to try to resolve difficult questions in legal theory with a language

* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to the
Behavioral Economics and Public Policy Program at Harvard Law School for support, and
to Dale Carpenter, Eric Posner, Samantha Power, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable
comments on an early draft.
1. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U L. REV. 74 (2000), for a
superb discussion of interpretive choice.
2. Richard Ekins, Objects of Interpretation, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2016)
(replying to Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 193 (2015)).
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lesson. Long ago, H.L.A. discussed this error under the name of
formalism, and I think that Elkin is engaged in that kind of
formalism here.3
A few examples, taken from familiar disputes about
particular constitutional provisions: Do affirmative action
programs run afoul of the constitutional commitment to “equal
protection”? Do bans on commercial advertising violate the
protection of “freedom of speech”? Does the grant of “executive
power” to the president forbid the creation of independent
regulatory agencies? In each of these cases, it is certainly possible
to offer an understanding of these terms that produces a “yes”
answer. But that understanding is not compulsory. Speakers of
the English language need not accept it.4 (I expect that Ekins
would agree on that count.)
The word “interpretation” is analogous, certainly in the
context of constitutional law. I have noted that there are some
things that cannot count as interpretation, but the term itself does
not permit us to choose among radically different understandings,
and it does not require us to settle on intended meaning. I confess
that I am deeply puzzled that anyone could think otherwise.
Ronald Dworkin has offered a sustained account of
interpretation, suggesting that it is an effort to offer the best
constructive account of the relevant materials in law (and
elsewhere).5 Dworkin may be wrong on some things, or on many
things, but the English language hardly rules his view out of
bounds. When he rejects an account of interpretation akin to that
defended by Ekins, he is not displaying confusion about the
meaning of words. He has not failed to understand the meaning
of the word “interpretation.”
The overwhelming majority of members of the Supreme
Court, now and throughout history, do not interpret the

3. H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1965). It is possible, however, to identify
a kind of formalism that insists on following the actual or plain meaning of texts, and that
does not claim, wrongly, that vague or ambiguous texts have a single meaning. Uses of
actual or plain meaning raise their own questions, but that is not my topic here. For a
valuable discussion, see William Baude & Ryan David Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805431.
4. I am bracketing here questions about the role of history and original
understandings.
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1985).
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Constitution by attempting to ascertain intended meaning.6 (The
same is true in many other nations.) Those who reject intended
meaning have diverse accounts of interpretation, and some are
better than others. But when a judge rejects intended meaning,
and nonetheless struggles hard over how to interpret words like
“equal protection” or “due process of law,” it is unhelpful—a kind
of stipulation, an effort to declare victory without doing the
(normative) work required to earn it—to say that they are no
longer engaged in the enterprise of interpretation. It is, in short, a
species of formalism in the sense that I am using the term.
Some clichés bear repeating: The meaning of words depends
on their use. In law—and I think in many other social activities,
including music, art, and literature—reasonable people can and
do argue over the best conception of interpretation. Intended
meaning is unquestionably one candidate, but there are others. To
choose among the plausible candidates, judges and lawyers need
normative criteria external to texts, and it is hardly sufficient to
investigate interpretation as a social practice (in, for example,
ordinary conversations). It is necessary to think about the world
and to look outward, rather than to pretend that definitions can
solve the problem.

6. I am putting to one side the relationship between “common law constitutional
law” and interpretation. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).

